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Abstract
To understand and appreciate Kahneman and Tversky’s work in contemporary behavioral 
economics we need to understand the historical context in which it stands. In this paper I 
retrace a number of elements in the history of the mathematics of rational decisions to show 
that in contemporary behavioral economics history partly repeats itself. The rise of 
mathematical probability in the seventeenth century led to some fundamental problems, most 
famously illustrated by the St. Petersburg paradoxes. D. Bernoulli saved the mathematics by 
distinguishing subjective from objective wealth. The logarithmic relation between the two 
was anachronistically understood by the psychophysicists as the psychophysics of wealth and 
through psychophysics picked up by the English marginalists. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s equation of money with utility should thus be understood as turning the clock 
back to before Bernoulli. The distinction between the actual value of a choice and the 
individual perception thereof that Kahneman and Tversky made in prospect theory repeated 
Bernoulli’s argument of some 250 years earlier. Kahneman’s work of the 1990s, in which he 
distinguished objective decision utility from subjective experienced utility, further illustrates 
this repetition of history.
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1. Introduction
A clear line runs from the beginning of the mathematics of rational behavior in the 
seventeenth century to current debates in behavioral economics. If we look at the use of 
objective versus subjective value in contemporary behavioral economics history is partly 
repeating itself. The aim of this paper is to retrace the relevant aspects of the history of the 
mathematics of rational behavior with the purpose of showing in what way history is currently 
repeating itself. The argument proceeds chronologically.
2. The mathematics of rational behavior
The mathematics of rational behavior began in 1654. In that year, nobleman-gambler 
Chevalier de Mere presented Blaise Pascal and Piere Fermat, with a number of gambling 
problems [Jorland (1987), Samuelson (1977)]. Upon de Mere’s instigation, Pascal and Fermat 
discussed amongst others the following problem. Suppose two noblemen sit down to play a 
coin-tossing gamble in which the first to have two heads or tails wins, a game that ends after 
at most three tosses. Suppose further that for some reason the two noblemen-gamblers have to 
stop after one heads. What would in that case be a rational division of the money? Intuitively 
it is clear that the money should not be split equally because the player with heads has a larger 
chance of winning. But how much more should this player receive? When continued, the 
game could end in three ways: 1) heads (heads player wins), 2) tails, tails (tails player wins), 
3) tails, heads (heads player wins). It thus seems that the money should be divided (2/3: 1/3). 
The crucial conceptual insight, however, is to see that in fact there are four possibilities. We 
also have to consider the imaginary toss after the second toss turns heads. The complete 
number of possibilities is: 1) heads, heads (heads player wins), 2) heads, tails (heads player 
wins), 3) tails, tails (tails player wins), 4) tails, heads (heads player wins). A rational division 
of the money is thus (3/4:1/4).
From the large body of literature on the Enlightenment mathematicians of probability 
it is well known that no distinction was made between determining the rational solution in 
situations of uncertainty, and the question of what a rational person would actually do in such 
situations [e.g. Hacking (1975), Daston (1988), and Gigerenzer et al. (1989)]. These two were 
one and the same thing. Hence, it was a maj or problem for the mathematics when it became 
clear that gambles could be constructed in which the rational solution provided by the 
mathematics was clearly at odds with the intuitive idea of the rational solution. The most 
famous example of these problems was the St. Petersburg paradox. Consider again the two 
noblemen who want to play a coin-tossing gamble. But suppose now that nobleman one
2
proposes to nobleman two to pay him two ducats when the coin falls heads on the first toss, 
four ducats if it also falls heads on the second toss, eight ducats for the third heads, and so on 
ad infinitum until the coin turns up tails. Nobleman one, however, does not play this game for 
free and demands an entrance fee. When nobleman two wants to be rational, what is the 
entrance fee he is maximally willing to pay? The pay-off from this gamble is n i = 2 i , with i
the number of heads tossed; the probability is p  = ^ 1  
monetary gain E  (n )for nobleman two is
Combine both and the expected
TO TO f  "1
E ( n )  = £ p tn,  = £ [ - |  2 i = 1 + 1 + 1 + .
i=1 i=1 V 2 •
. = TO (1)
Hence, a rational nobleman two would be willing to pay all his wealth and all the wealth he 
will earn in the rest of his life as an entrance fee for this gamble. Intuitively everybody readily 
agrees that this is ridiculous. It simply cannot be rational to put the accumulated wealth of 
one’s entire life in such a gamble. Something had to be wrong with the mathematics.
A solution to the St. Petersburg was offered by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. Bernoulli’s 
idea was simple: do not use the objective value of the gamble, but use the subjective value, 
the utility.
the value of an item must not be based on its price, but rather on the utility it yields. 
The price of the item is dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; 
the utility however, is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making 
the estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more 
significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both gain the same amount. 
[Bernoulli (1738/1954), p.24}
Bernoulli defines utility to be a marginally increasing function of wealth, where wealth is 
loosely defined as the monetary value of all the individual’s possessions plus the individual’s 
capacities to earn money. The utility derived from a given monetary gain thus decreases with 
increasing initial wealth. In mathematical terms,1
1 This is a simplification of that part of Bernoulli’s paper that is of relevance here. Bernoulli’s paper and its 1954 
English translation for Econometrica raise a number of in themselves interesting issues. See for instance Jallais, 
Pradier, and Teira (2008), and Teira (2005).
3




with c a constant, dU  the change in utility, W  wealth, and dW  the change in wealth. 
Graphically,
Figure 1. The figure is an adapted version from Bernoulli (1738/1954), p.26
When instead of the objective value of the monetary gain the subjective value of the utility is 
taken the mathematical expectation2 of the St. Petersburg gamble will not go to infinity but, 
depending on the exact parameters of equation 2, will asymptotically go to a number that is 
quite reasonable.3 Bernoulli thus successfully introduced a theory of maximizing expected 
utility as the basis for the study of rational decision behavior under uncertainty.
3. Psychophysics
Bernoulli’s relation between wealth and utility was corroborated by the work of the 
psychophysicists. In the middle of the 1850s Gustav Fechner, dissatisfied with the dominant 
Cartesian mind-body distinction, was looking for a more scientific basis for psychology 
[Murray (1993), Gigerenzer (1993)]. His solution was to base psychology upon the idea that 
human beings should be seen as on the one hand receiving input from the world through their 
senses, and on the other hand producing output in the form of behavior. Fechner, in other 
words, invented the stimulus-response paradigm. Now, it is clear that not every objective
2 The calculated expected utility is labeled ‘moral expectation’ by Bernoulli.
3 The answer depends on the initial wealth of nobleman two and on the precise parameters of the utility function. 
Bernoulli estimates a typical maximum rational entrance fee of about 3 ducats.
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stimulus will evoke the same subjective sensation. An extra kilogram feels differently when 
one is already carrying five, or already carrying fifty kilograms. The first step in this new 
research paradigm therefore was to measure how external stimuli are perceived by human 
beings. The psychophysical law that describes the relation between objective stimulus and 
subjective sensation that has become known as the Weber-Fechner law is the following.
dSe = c <dSS-  (3)
S t
where dSe is the change in sensation, S t the stimulus, dSt the change in stimulus and c a 
constant. Graphically,
Both the formula and the graph are similar to Bernoulli’s relation between wealth and utility. 
Indeed, when we think of Bernoulli’s wealth as the objective stimulus and utility as the 
subjective sensation it is not difficult to see how Bernoulli’s paper anachronistically could be 
interpreted as the psychophysics of wealth and utility.
And this is precisely what was done by the English marginalists of the late nineteenth 
century [Blaug (1996), p.316-318].4 A main source of inspiration for these scientists was 
utilitarianism, of which especially Bentham stands out as a dominant influence. Using 
psychophysics marginalists like Jevons and later Edgeworth sought to reduce Benthamite 
utility, which depended on seven factors, to a one-dimensional measurement scale of the
4 Like Blaug (1996) I am making some very rigorous historcial shortcuts here. For extensive discussions on the 
relation between English marginalists, Benthamite utilitarianism, psychophysics and psychophysiology see Maas
(2005), Sigot (2002), Warke (2000).
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individual perception of pleasure and pain [Cohen (1997)]. The English marginalists 
interpreted Bernoulli’s solution to the St. Petersburg paradox as the psychophysics of wealth 
and utility and at the same time used psychophysics to reduce Benthamite utility to a one­
dimensional measurement scale of utility for hedonic pleasure seeking and pain avoiding 
individuals. Thus Marshall stated that
The clerk with £100 a-year will walk to business in a much heavier rain than the clerk 
with £300 a-year; for the cost of a ride by tram or omnibus measures a greater benefit 
to the poorer man than to the richer. [Marshall (1890/1952), p.13]
4. The elimination of Bernoullian utility
Through psychophysics the idea of decreasing subjective valuation of objective value became 
firmly ingrained in early twentieth century economics. In the 1940s and early 1950s, however, 
it was again abandoned, and explicitly so. The principal reasons for abandoning decreasing 
subjective value were von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theoretical rebuttal of the theory, and 
the application of the theory in for instance Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952) and 
Markowitz (1959) that illustrated the fundamental problem it faced in explaining economic 
behavior o f individuals.
4.1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory o f Games and Economic Behavior (1944) extended 
expected utility theory to situations in which the rational decision depends on behavior of 
other agents. They showed that also in games in which the uncertainty is endogenous it is 
possible to mathematize rational behavior.5 Such games included Bridge, Chess, strategic 
price setting behavior o f  firms, and nuclear arms races during cold wars. In the book, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern assumed for reasons of simplification utility to be equivalent with 
money.
We wish to concentrate on one problem -  which is not that of the measurement of 
utilities and of preferences -  and we shall therefore attempt to simplify all other 
characteristics as far as reasonably possible. We shall therefore assume that the aim o f 
all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as entrepreneurs, is money,
5 See for an illuminating example of the transition from decision theory to game theory the translation of Borel’s 
papers for Econometrica in Frechet (1953).
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or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be unrealistically 
divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the quantitative 
sense, with whatever “satisfaction” or “utility” is desired by each participant. [Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p.8, emphasis added]
With regard to the unit of analysis, and this is a crucial, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) thus effectively turned the clock back to before Bernoulli, when the rational decision 
depended on the absolute, objective value of money. For von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) the agents in decision problems, games and the economy want to maximize their 
monetary income, not their Bernoullian utility. However, in a concept-blurring move von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) labeled this money ‘utility.’ Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s agents maximize money, or monetary equivalents, but this money was called 
utility. In other words, the value used for the calculation was objective in pre-Bernoullian 
times, subjective following Bernoulli, and again objective after von Neumann and 
Morgenstern.
4.2 Friedman and Savage
Bernoullian utility and decreasing marginal returns was further problematized in the 1950s by 
Markowitz [Markowitz (1959)] and Friedman and Savage [Friedman and Savage (1948, 
1952)]. Let me take Friedman and Savage (1948) as an example. Friedman and Savage put 
themselves in the tradition of “Bernoulli’s celebrated analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox” 
[Friedman and Savage (1948), p.281], but broadened this research to include all (economic) 
choice situations that involve uncertainty of some sort. The basic problem they wanted to 
address was the fact that Bernoulli’s concave utility functions could only explain insurance, 
not gambling. That is, Bernoulli’s utility function offered an explanation for the fact that 
people are willing to pay money to reduce risk, but by consequence also supposed that people 
will not engage in fair, or less than fair gambles. This is a problem that goes beyond 
insurances and gambles. In order to explain the co-existence of both risk-averse and risk­
seeking behavior the utility function would have to be concave and convex at the same time. 
One could solve this problem by observing that the amounts of money for which people 
insure themselves are typically lower than the often very high amounts of money people can 
win in gambles and lotteries. In that case, Bernoulli’s concave utility function is followed by a 
convex part. But then one forgets, as Friedman and Savage quickly observed, that in lotteries 
there often is a range of prices, including relatively low prices. The only way to rationalize
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this behavior is a “wiggly utility curve” that describes people as risk-averse for low incomes, 
risk-seeking for higher incomes, and again risk-averse for the highest incomes.
< J T I l i T v l u i  ■
I h u m c  JTJ
Figure 2, Friedman and Savage (1948), p.297
A wiggly utility curve to explain gambling and insurance makes the whole idea of 
utility-income relation look rather peculiar. Who would take seriously such a utility curve? 
Both Friedman and Savage retreated silently from their two collaborative papers. Friedman 
simply put the subject aside and never again tried to theorize about the relation between 
money and utility. Savage in his The Foundations o f Statistics (1954) abandoned the wiggly 
utility curve by siding fully with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s approach. “For a long 
period,” Savage argued,” economists accepted Bernoulli’s idea of moral wealth as the 
measurement of a person’s well-being apart from any consideration of probability, though 
“utility” rather than “moral wealth” has been the popular name for this concept among 
English-speaking economists.” As a result, “[e]conomists were for a time enthusiastic about 
the principle of diminishing marginal utility, and they saw what they believed to be 
reflections of it in many aspects of everyday life” [Savage (1954), p.95]. However, thanks to 
von Neumann and Morgenstern Savage was now back on the right track and measured 
choice-options using a money scale of utility. Utility equals money and is nothing more than a 
convenient measurement scale of preferences. “A function U that [..] arithmetizes the relation 
of preferences among acts will be called utility. [..] I have chosen to use the name “utility” in 
preference to any other, in spite of some unfortunate connotations this name has in connection 
with economic theory, because it was adopted by von Neumann and Morgenstern when they 
revived the concept to which it refers, in a most stimulating way” [Savage (1954), p.95].
In postwar economics the idea of decreasing returns to scale remained alive in relation 
to increased use of production factors, increased use of human capital, and increased use of
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resources. But as a law determining the relation between the objective value of a choice and 
the individual, subjective valuation thereof the idea of Bernoullian utility or decreasing 
returns to scale disappeared.
5. Kahneman and Tversky
In 1958 Ward Edwards created the Engineering Psychology Laboratory at the University of 
Michigan. Based on two widely read overview articles [Edwards (1954,1961)] Edwards 
founded a new psychological program labeled behavioral decision research by introducing 
marginalist economic theory of the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century into 
experimental psychology. Within the experimental psychological framework Edwards 
understood economics as constituting a normative theory of individual rational human 
decision theory. The task of psychology, Edwards argued, was to test the normative claims of 
the economic theory in the psychological laboratories and to investigate how human decision 
behavior could be improved should the actual decisions people make proof to be inconsistent 
with the normative theory. The basic assumption of Edwards, however, was that human 
beings are basically good rational decision makers that can make the decisions according to 
the predictions of the normative theory. The key for managing and improving human decision 
making according to Edwards lay in the organization of the structures in which human beings 
operate. If a general in a nuclear command center was unreliable as rational decision maker 
this was not because the general was an irrational decision maker but because the 
informational and decision structure of the system had not been properly designed.
This basic assumption changed in the behavioral decision research of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the latter a student of Edwards in the 1960s. In the 1970s 
Kahneman and Tversky developed a research program, baptized heuristics and biases, that 
relied on the basic assumption that people often deviate from the normative rule of rational 
decision making. Because human beings employ heuristics to make their rational decisions, 
these decisions are often subject to systematic biases. In 1979 Tversky and Kahneman 
extended this research program with a descriptive theory of rational human decision behavior 
that accounted for all the observed systematic deviations from the rational norm. Prospect 
theory, as it was called, was published in Econometrica in an effort to not only convince their 
fellow psychologists but also make an argument in economics. In prospect theory Kahneman 
and Tversky re-introduced the Bernoullian idea that the objective value of a choice may be 
different from the individual, subjective perception thereof. More specifically, individuals 
valued increasing objective value decreasingly in the positive domain. In a refinement of
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Bernoulli Kahneman and Tversky introduced the idea that for the negative domain the 
relation is the exact reverse and that the whole individual perceptive framework depends on 
the reference point that is used, a reference point that not only differs per individual but may 
also differ with respect to the way the question is formulated. Thus the following curve was 
drawn.
Figure 4, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.279
Aside from the refinement of the reference dependence and the extension of the 
analysis to the negative realm, the S-shaped objective-subjective value curve replicates the 
Bernoullian argument of some 250 years earlier. Bernoulli responded to the problematic use 
of objective value for calculating the rational expectation following the St. Petersburg 
paradox. Around World War Two however the clock was reversed in economics and once 
again the objective value of choice options were used as inputs for the rational decision. 
Kahneman and Tversky, then, responded to the problematic use of the objective value as 
illustrated in Allais’s and their own experiments and proposed to again make a distinction 
between objective and subjective value.
After Grether and Plott (1979, 1980) replicated and thus corroborated the experiments 
of the psychologists showing the irrationality of individual behavior, an initially small but 
rapidly growing number of economists set themselves to incorporate the insights of 
Kahneman and Tversky into economics [Heukelom (forthcoming)]. These ‘behavioral 
economists,’ as they called themselves from 1994 onwards [Loewenstein, personal 
communication] principally investigate the implication of incorporating Tversky and 
Kahneman’s normative-descriptive distinction and accompanying prospect theory into 
economics. A prominent member of these behavioral economics has been Kahneman himself,
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whose principal research program of the 1990s has been to extend the objective -  subjective 
value distinction as commenced by prospect theory. To distinguish between the utility of the 
normative and the descriptive theory, Kahneman from the beginning of the 1990s onwards 
has argued for a conceptual distinction between ‘decision utility’ and ‘experienced utility’
[e.g. Kahneman (1994, 2003), Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997)]. Decision utility refers 
to the standard use of utility in decision theory and can be equated with the utility concept of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). It is the objective monetary value of an option or the 
representation of this option in monetary terms. The subjectively perceived utility is called 
‘experienced utility.’ Like Bernoulli, who argued that the objective monetary value of an 
option cannot be a good measure of decision behavior, Kahneman argued that the objective 
‘decision utility’ of von Neumann-Morgenstern has proven not to be a good basis for a 
descriptive theory of rational decision behavior. Where Bernoulli reasoned that the subjective 
value of the monetary loss or gain should be the basis of the calculation, so Kahneman argued 
that only the subjective ‘experienced utility’ can be a good basis for a descriptive theory.
6. Conclusion
I have retraced a number of elements in the history of the mathematics of rational decisions to 
show that in contemporary behavioral economics history partly repeats itself. The rise of 
mathematical probability in the seventeenth century led to some fundamental problems, most 
famously illustrated by the St. Petersburg paradoxes. D. Bernoulli saved the mathematics by 
distinguishing subjective from objective wealth. The logarithmic relation between the two 
was anachronistically understood by the psychophysicists as the psychophysics of wealth and 
through psychophysics picked up by the English marginalists. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s equation of money with utility should thus be understood as turning the clock 
back to before Bernoulli. The distinction between the actual value of a choice and the 
individual perception thereof that Kahneman and Tversky made in prospect theory repeated 
Bernoulli’s argument of some 250 years earlier. Kahneman’s work of the 1990s, in which he 
distinguished objective decision utility from subjective experienced utility, further illustrates 
this repetition of history. Acknowledging this aspect of history supports an understanding and 
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